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Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are formed through interconnected components capable of computation,
communication, sensing and changing the physical world. The development of these systems poses a significant
challenge since they have to be designed in away to ensure cyber-security without impacting their performance.
This article presents the Security Cost Modelling Framework (SCMF) and shows supported by an experimental
study how it can be used to measure, normalise and aggregate the overall performance of a CPS. Unlike
previous studies, our approach uses different metrics to measure the overall performance of a CPS and provides
a methodology for normalising the measurement results of different units to a common Cost Unit. Moreover,
we show how the Security Costs can be extracted from the overall performance measurements which allows to
quantify the overhead imposed by performing security-related tasks. Furthermore, we describe the architecture
of our experimental testbed and demonstrate the applicability of SCMF in an experimental study. Our results
show that measuring the overall performance and extracting the security costs using SCMF can serve as basis
to redesign interactions to achieve the same overall goal at less costs.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A Cyber-Physical System (CPS) consists of components capable of computation, communication,
sensing and changing the physical world [6, 24]. On their own these components often have just
enough computational resources (resource constrained devices) for a specific task, e.g. controlling
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a sensor or an actuator. The so-called Internet of Things (IoT) can be considered as the backbone
of a CPS that interconnects these constrained devices enabling them to form complex networks
of embedded systems [22]. A CPS consisting of interconnected components with sensing and
actuating functionalities enables the conjunction of the cyber-verse and the physical world [31].
Hence, this opens up a wide range of application opportunities in various domains [34] but also
poses new challenges regarding performance and security.
The main challenge regarding performance and security is to design CPS in a way to be as secure
as possible without impacting the overall performance. Especially when a CPS is integrated in
critical infrastructures [60] the importance of cyber security countermeasures cannot be stressed
enough. For instance, a successful cyber-attack launched at a CPS can cause disruptions tran-
scending the cyber realm and lead to damages in the physical world [45]. However, the practice of
providing security always produces additional overhead which might lead to a compromise between
performance and security especially with CPS consisting of constrained devices. Ultimately, to
avoid potential performance issues requires design approaches that allow to run the interactions of
a CPS efficiently while keeping a high level of security.
This brings the challenge to determine which approach is the most efficient if there is more
than one potential solution. An interaction of a CPS is usually designed for a specific application
purpose (main functionality) which involves a number of components that together perform a set
of tasks. These tasks are directly related to the main functionality of the CPS since their execution
contributes towards meeting the purpose of the application. Besides performing these functional
tasks, additional tasks are needed in order to provide security while the interaction is executed.
For instance, two interacting components could perform the additional tasks of encrypting and
decryptingmessages to protect the communication fromman-in-the-middle attacks. These additional
security-related tasks are necessary to provide a specific security countermeasure in addition to the
other function tasks. To design efficient and secure interactions requires measuring the function
and security-related tasks and aggregate them to calculate the overall performance of interactions.
In this article the Security Cost Modelling Framework (SCMF) is introduced capable of measuring,
normalising and aggregating Functional Costs and Security Costs of CPS. Functional Costs refer
to the measurement results of all performed functional tasks at runtime. Security Costs refer to
the measurement results of all performed security-related tasks at runtime. First, we present the
Onion Layer Model to formally describe interactions, their participating components and performed
tasks. Next, we present four Metric Types and show how the raw data measurement results of each
type can be calculated and weighted. This allows us to use many different metrics to measure the
performance of executed functional and security-related tasks at runtime. Furthermore, we present
a methodology to normalise [54] and aggregate these measurement results with different units to
calculate the Total Costs of CPS, where Total Costs refer to the measurement results of all performed
tasks at runtime (functional and security-related).
The main objective of this article is to demonstrate how the SCMF works by measuring the
Functional Costs and Security Costs of a real CPS. This is done through an experimental study. To
achieve this we present an overall use case (Closed-Loop Temperature Control) and show two different
approaches (Use Case 1, Use Case 2) of implementing it. In addition we describe the minimum
architectural building blocks needed to setup a CPS that runs both implemented approaches of the
use case (testbed). Furthermore, we describe all necessary tools to measure the performance of
these two approaches at runtime. Finally, we measure, normalise, weigh, aggregate and compare
the Total Costs of both use cases and demonstrate how the SCMF can be used to evaluate which of
the two solutions is performing more efficiently.
The central research questions of this article are: (i) How can the Functional Costs and Security
Costs be measured and modelled? (ii) What Metric Types can be used to capture the performance
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of interactions at runtime? (iii) How can measurement results with different units be normalised
to create a generic Cost Unit? (iv) How can Functional Costs and Security Costs be aggregated to
calculate the Total Costs of an interaction?
Our approach is a new proposal for measuring the Functional Costs and Security Costs of CPS by
quantifying the resulting overhead of executed functional and security-related tasks. Even though
there are many approaches for measuring the performance of computer systems, they either use
a single metric (e.g. execution time) or only compare the results of the same Metric Types. To
the best of our knowledge there is no other approach for measuring a computing node using
different metrics that are then normalised to produce a single number with a generic unit (Cost
Unit). Additionally, our proposal contains a description of the necessary architectural elements to
set up a CPS consisting of distributed computing nodes and measure their Functional Costs and
Security Costs. Furthermore, we explain how the proposed SCMF can be applied to measure all
functional and security-related tasks using different metrics, normalise the results and aggregate
them using the Onion Layer Model. Since CPS are formed by interconnected components, the SCMF
can be used at Design Time to implement interactions, while preserving security and optimally
enhancing resource usage.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows: In Section 2, we discuss related work.
Subsequently, in Section 3, we present the Onion Layer Model for describing Functional Costs and
Security Costs in CPS, and identify four different Metric Types to measure them. Additionally, we
show howmeasurements with different units can be normalised and aggregated using the presented
model. In Section 4, we describe the architecture that we used to demonstrate Functional Cost and
Security Cost measurements in an implemented CPS. Then, in Section 5, we present two different
possible solutions of how an interaction within the CPS could be implemented and evaluate their
resulting Functional Costs and Security Costs in an experimental study. In Section 6, we discuss
the importance of measuring the Functional Costs and Security Costs by referring to the results of
the experimental study, and point out future applications towards digital twins and performance
optimisation. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude our work.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
In this section, we highlight the differences between existing work and ours and elaborate how
the proposed SCMF fills the gap in the related work. The literature review covers measuring and
modelling computational performance in general; existing performance and security metrics; and,
predictive models based on past measurements. Furthermore, we also discuss related work regarding
theoretical backgrounds and security concerns in Industry 4.0 including CPS and IoT-Frameworks.
2.1 Background
This article builds on three publications from our previous work that lay the foundation towards
developing the SCMF. The initial idea regarding measuring Security Costs was presented in [29],
where we argued that providing security always produces an additional overhead that could be
measured and analysed. However, this first publication mainly focused on how much money and
time has to be spent to buy and implement security controls to design secure applications. This
focus was redirected in the following publication [27] by introducing the idea of formally describing
Security Costs of interacting components and their executed security-related tasks in CPS. In this
second publication we presented the idea of the Onion Layer Model on a mainly theoretical level
without explaining how it could be applied in practice. Therefore, in our third publication [28], we
extended the previous paper by describing how the model could be used to measure Security Costs
of CPS at runtime. In this regard, we argued that two mechanisms are required, where one monitors
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which components interact with each other, while the other measures their performed tasks. Even
though, this paper showed how the model could be used at runtime, it again only described the two
mechanisms in theory. Furthermore, the second and third publication did not provide any answers
regarding how measurement results with different units could be normalised and aggregated.
In this article, we intend to go a step further and close the gaps of all three previous publications.
In this regard, we present a framework (SCMF) and show in an experimental study how it can be
used to measure, normalise and aggregate the overall performance (Total Costs) of CPS. Moreover,
we explain that the Total Costs are made up from measuring the performance of functional tasks
(Functional Costs) and security-related tasks (Security Costs). Therefore, we first present our model
including four different Metric Types and describe how each of them is used differently when
measuring these tasks. Based on these Metric Types, we then show how to calculate weights and
why it is necessary to weight raw data measurement results. Next, we extend the Onion Layer Model
by providing a methodology for normalising measurement results with different units. Moreover,
we present an algorithm that uses raw data measurement results as an input and returns the
calculated Functional Costs and Security Costs as an output. In addition to that we demonstrate in an
experimental study, how a CPS can be set up and its Functional Costs and Security Costs measured,
normalised and aggregated including a description of our experimental setup (testbed).
2.2 Economics of Information Security
The literature review has resulted in identifying the discipline of Economics of Information Security
as the high-level research field which (according to [8]) can be categorised in the following sub-
disciplines of Economics of Privacy, The Information Security Business, Economics of Vulnerabilities,
Measuring Electronic Crime, and Information Security Regulation. In the early 2000s the Economics of
Information Security emerged as a thriving and fast-moving research discipline, where the interest
initially came from the banking industry [10]. Even though banks spent more on security to prevent
card fraud, the number of attacks still continued to increase. Several research streams have been
developing, particularly investigation into Measuring the Cost of Cyber-Crime [9], Review on the
Scale and Nature of Cyber Crime [36], Examination of Impact of Notice and Take-Down [37, 38], and
Analysis on various Cyber-Crime Attacks [7, 23, 61]. However, most of the presented approaches
and frameworks provide methodologies for estimating/measuring the size of the investment when
buying hardware/software (including configuration) for providing cyber security for an existing
system. Other approaches and frameworks focus on evaluating how much harm (or cost) a specific
cyber-attack caused and how much it costs to repair the resulting damage. To the best of our
knowledge, in the field of Economics of Information Security there are currently no approaches for
measuring, how much security costs during the operation of a system. In other words, how high is
the overhead for providing security for a specific system at runtime. This question is aggravated
even more when the system is a CPS, where a cyber-attack might cause disastrous consequences in
both the cyber-verse and the physical world [42].
2.3 Measuring Cyber Security without Security Costs-Relatedness
In other related work, there are many studies that focus on measuring cyber security, but they do
so without referring to the resulting costs of providing security. In addition to that some of the
presented approaches are often limited by the usage of a single metric. For instance, in [20, 55] the
authors show how the performance of a process can be measured, while the focus in [30, 50–52] is
on evaluating the energy consumption. A summary of related work regarding security metrics has
been provided by Yee in [62]. He first establishes the argument that many security metrics exist,
but most of them are ineffective and not meaningful. Next, he provides a definition of a "good" and
a "bad" metric and explains the difference between "traditional" and "scientifically based" security
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metrics. Finally, Yee presents his literature search on security metrics which is based on various
frameworks. Other related work use methods and frameworks to evaluate how secure e.g. a system
is [12, 14, 15, 35, 46, 49]. In other words, these solutions focus on evaluating whether a security
control has been implemented or not and how much effort it takes (or how much it costs) to do so.
This approach of measuring the costs of implementing security controls using money as a metric is
similar to our first publication in [29]. The work of Naylor et al. [41] comes closest to our presented
approach in this article, where they used different metrics to measure the Security Costs of the
Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS). The major difference compared to our work is that
Naylor et al. measured the HTTP and then compare the results to the measurements of the HTTPS.
These measurement results were compared (metric by metric) independently to each other to shed
some lights on the impacts on latency, data consumption and battery life for clients. In this article
we take one step further towards aggregating Functional Costs and Security Costs of a CPS, by using
many different metrics for measuring and a normalisation method to create a common Cost Unit.
2.4 Engineering Challenges and Security Concerns in Industry 4.0
The vast majority of research related to Industry 4.0 and CPS currently focuses more on general
challenges [22, 43], design principles [24, 33, 44], or engineering [6, 25]. However, in [60] the
authors give an overview of the security concerns in CPS, identify challenges and summarise
countermeasures. Rajkumar, De Niz and Klein [45] demonstrate further that the complexity of CPS
requires more effort to analyse and defend it. The reason for that is the explosion of states when
considering combinations of events. Additionally, they provide theoretical approaches for dealing
with cyber threats and countermeasure models for CPS under attack.
2.5 CPS and IoT-Frameworks
Regarding CPS and the IoT, there are various approaches, platforms and frameworks supporting
the Industry 4.0 movement. Derhamy et al. [19] summarise commercially available IoT frameworks
including the IoTivity framework [26], the IPSO Alliance framework [47], the Light Weight Machine
to Machine (LWM2M) framework [4], the AllJoyn framework [3] and the Smart Energy Profile 2.0
(SEP2.0) [5]. Most of the cloud-based frameworks follow a data-driven architecture in which all
involved IoT-components are connected to a global cloud using one Service Oriented Architecture
(SOA) protocol. The Arrowhead Framework [18], on the contrary, follows an event-driven approach,
in which a local cloud is governed through the use of core systems for registering and discovering
services, authorisation and orchestration. Since everything within an Arrowhead local cloud is a
service, new supporting systems can be developed and added to the already existing ones. This
enables implementing and deploying any use case independent of complexity and number of
components running supporting systems. For this reason, we chose to deploy our overall use case
and draw the system boundaries of the deployed CPS by using the Arrowhead Framework.
2.6 Performance Measurement using an Agent-Based Approach
Another reason for using the Arrowhead Framework was that it is an open source project imple-
mented in Java [17]. This allows us to instrument the code of all components within the deployed
Arrowhead local cloud and measure the Functional Costs and the Security Costs of all interactions.
To overcome the challenge of instrumenting each line of code manually [1] we used Pinpoint [40],
which is an agent-based Application Performance Management (APM) tool modelled after Google’s
Dapper [48]. Pinpoint uses agents to instrument the bytecode of a Java application at runtime and
capture performance data using different built-in metrics. A further advantage: Pinpoint was built
for large-scale distributed systems and has a minimal impact on the overall performance[16, 39].
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2.7 Summary
As discussed in this section and summarised in Table 1, the related work focuses either on,
• measuring the costs of buying hardware and software for protecting computer systems, or
• calculating the damage caused by specific cyber-attacks, or
• evaluating how secure a system is, or
• using just a single metric to measure a specific aspect of a system, or
• comparing measurements results on a "metric by metric"-basis.
This article aims at closing the identified gaps by introducing the SCMF for quantifying Security
Costs of CPS. The proposed framework follows the idea of measuring performed tasks of each
component of an interaction by using many different metrics. Since different metrics produce results
with different units, the SCMF also provides a methodology for normalising these measurement
results to a common Cost Unit which then can be aggregated. In this regard, we demonstrate in an
experimental study how the SCMF can be used to measure, analyse and compare the interactions
in two different use cases.
Table 1. Measuring Security Costs (Summary of Literature Review)
Economics of Information Security Sources
Introduction to Economics and Information Security [10]
Measuring the impact and resulting costs of cybercrimes. [9]
Review on the scale and nature of cyber crime. [36]
Examination of impact of notice and take-down. [37, 38]
Measuring the impact of various cyber-crime attacks. [7, 23, 61]
Measuring Cyber Security without Security Cost-Relatedness Sources
Summary on measurable security metrics. [62]
Measuring process performance & complexity. [20, 55]
Measurement of performance and energy consumption. [30, 50–52]
Measuring how secure a specific system is (level of security). [12, 14, 15, 35, 46, 49]
Measuring the impact of various cyber-crime attacks. [41]
Engineering Challenges and Security Concerns in Industry 4.0 Sources
General challenges of Industry 4.0 and CPS [22, 43]
Design principles and challenges of CPS. [24, 33, 44]
Engineering challenges regarding CPS and Industry 4.0 applications. [6, 25]
Security concerns and analysis requirements to defend and secure CPS. [42, 45, 60]
CPS and IoT-Frameworks Sources
Review of existing frameworks supporting the Industry 4.0 movement. [19]
Data-driven IoT-Frameworks running in a global cloud. [3–5, 26, 47]
Event-driven IoT-Frameworks running in a local cloud. [18]
Performance Measurement using an Agent-Based Approach Sources
Bytecode instrumentation and APM-tools. [1, 16, 39, 40, 48]
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3 MODEL
In this section, we present an approach for evaluating Functional Costs and Security Costs in a CPS
by abstracting all interactions within the CPS using the Onion Layer Model. By doing so we describe
the functionality of the Onion Layer Model and explain how it can be used to model the entirety
of all interactions, their participating components and performed tasks within a CPS. Next, we
show that measuring Functional Costs and Security Costs requires different measurement techniques
and summarise them in four Metric Types. Based on the Metric Types we explain how to calculate
a weight which can be used to emphasise each result more or less. Furthermore, we present a
normalisation method which can be used to transform the raw data measurement results with
different units (based on the usage of different metrics) to a common Cost Unit. Finally, we present
an algorithm for normalising and aggregating Functional Costs and Security Costs.
3.1 Onion Layer Model
As previously mentioned, a CPS is formed by a number of components that are capable of measuring
the physical world by using sensors and changing it by controlling actuators. In addition these
components are capable of computation and communication using the IoT infrastructure, where they
are interconnected with each other. Together they form logical units within a CPS by participating
in one or more interactions to reach a common goal or serve a specific purpose. For instance,
one component could be using a sensor to measure the temperature of a room while another
component uses the measured data to control an air-conditioning system. The overall goal or
purpose of this interaction would be to measure and control the temperature of a physical room.
To achieve this each component performs a number of different tasks which all together contribute
towards reaching this common goal. For instance, a component could be using a sensor to measure
the temperature of a room and sending the measured data to another component. This second
component verifies whether a predefined temperature limit has been reached and decides to activate
the air-conditioning system to cool down the room (if necessary).
An interaction in the context of a CPS refers to a logical unit that is independently executed at a
specific point in time and treated in a coherent and reliable way, independent of other interactions.
This means that one CPS cannot have two different interactions where the same components
participate in both of them at the same time and perform the exact same tasks. A redundancy
like this, would go against any design principle in engineering if it was not for the purpose of
duplication of critical components to increase reliability (e.g. backups or high-availability). That
being said, the total number of all interactions, the participating components, and their performed
tasks can be described as follows (for any set X , we use X̂ to denote its upper bound in this article):
I = {i1,i2,. . . ,i Î }, is the set of all interactions of CPS1 where Î defines the upper bound of I
C = {c1,c2,. . . ,cĈ }, is the set of all components in I , where Ĉ defines the upper bound of C
T = {t1,t2,. . . ,tT̂ }, is the set of all tasks in C , where T̂ defines the upper bound of T
For instance, within one interaction i1 there could be a set of components Ci1= {c1,c2,c3}, while
another interaction i2 has a different set of components Ci2= {c1,c2,c3,c4}. This means that the size
of a component set depends on the number of its components within a specific interaction. In the
previous example Ĉi1 compared to Ĉi2 has a smaller number of components (Ĉi1 < Ĉi2 ). Similar
to that the size of a task set T̂ also depends on the number of its tasks performed by a specific
component. If C1 performed fewer tasks in comparison to C2, the task set of the first component
would be smaller compared to the task set of the second component (T̂c1 < T̂c2 ). As mentioned before,
some of the performed tasks can be directly related to the main functionality, while others could be
directly related to providing security. As an example, the task for measuring the temperature of a
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room is related to the function, while encrypting a message before it is sent directly corresponds to
a security-related task. To measure the performance of a task, the Onion Layer Model suggests to use
a set of different metricsM = {m1,m2,. . . ,mM̂ }, where M̂ defines the upper bound ofM . Finally, the
measured tasks need to be categorised in functional and security-related tasks to be able to extract
the Security Costs from the Total Costs. As shown in Fig. 1, the Onion Layer Model describes a CPS
including all interactions, the participating components, their performed tasks, and all metrics used
for measuring the costs:
Fig. 1. Onion Layer Model for Modelling Functional Costs and Security Costs (adapted from Ivkić et al., 2019).
The Onion Layer Model allows describing the entirety of interactions within a specific CPS and
enables modelling the Functional Costs and Security Costs resulting from measuring functional
and security-related tasks. In other words, by using metricm1 to measure all performed tasks the
measurement results of functional tasks in comparison to the security-related tasks can be put
in perspective. As shown in (1), the Onion Layer Model enables modelling the Total Costs of an
interaction by summing up the Functional Costs and the Security Costs of a CPS:






















( Ûxicsm ∗wMT )
(1)
TotalCostsCPS1
represents the sum of the measured, normalised and aggregated
Functional Costs and Security Costs of CPS1∑ÎCPS
1
i=1 represents the set of all interactions of CPS1∑Ĉi




represents the set of all functional and security-related tasks performed by
component c, where F̂c is the set of all functional tasks and Ŝc is the set of
all security-related tasks, but both are the union set of all tasks T̂c = F̂c ∪ Ŝc∑M̂f
m=1,
∑M̂s
m=1 represents the set of all metrics used to measure all performed tasks
Ûx icf m , Ûx icsm
Ûx is the normalised value of x , where x is the raw data measurement result of
metricm used to measure task f (functional) or task s (security-related)
performed by component c , during interaction i
wMT
represents weight w of Metric TypeMT which can be used to emphasise
a normalised result Ûx , whereMT ∈ {MT1,MT2,MT3}
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As shown in (1), both the Functional Costs and Security Costs of CPS1 are calculated by four
different sums. The first sum
∑ÎCPS
1
i=1 represents all existing interactions of CPS1, while the second
sum
∑Ĉi





s=1) either all functional or security-related tasks performed by one component c. In this
regard, both sets together form the union set of all performed tasks of interaction i (T̂c = F̂c ∪ Ŝc ).




m=1 ) adds up all metrics which have been used to measure the
costs of one task f or s. As already mentioned, whenever different metrics are being used for
measurements it leads to having many results with different units. Thus, to be able to aggregate
all measurement results using the Onion Layer Model a normalisation methodology has to be
used. The formal description Ûxicf m or Ûxicsm specifies the normalised measurement result of metric
m used to measure task u or s which has been performed by component c that participated in
interaction i . Thus, this is an extension of the Onion Layer Model in [27, 28] to enable aggregating
these measurement results with different units by normalising them to a generic Cost Unit.
3.2 Metric Types and Weight Calculation
As described by the Onion Layer Model in (1), the resulting Total Costs of an interaction are a
reflection of performance measurements of interacting components and their performed tasks.
From a metrological perspective, there are many ways of measuring the performance of a specific
task depending on the used metric and how the measurement was carried out. In principle, there are
three basic characteristics of a computing node that are typically measured. The first characteristic
refers to counting how often an event occurs, the secondmeasures the duration of some time interval
and the third considers the size of some parameter [32]. At first glance the first characteristic might
seem promising when used as a metric to simply count the number of tasks within an interaction.
Even though it is not a big challenge to measure the number of executed tasks, the result of such a
measurement might give a false impression of actual costs. For instance, an interaction could be
designed in a way that it executes three functional and two security-related tasks, meaning a total
of five tasks. More precisely, this would mean that 40% of all executed tasks of this interaction are
directly related to security. However, if we used the second characteristic to measure how long it
takes to execute each task it might lead to a completely different result. For example, the results
of the second measurement could be that the execution of each functional task takes 3 seconds,
while the security-related tasks take 0.5 seconds each. In total, the second result shows that the
entire interaction takes 10 seconds, where the functional tasks take 9 seconds compared to the
security-related tasks with 1 second. This means that only 10% of all executed tasks are directly
related to security which shows a different picture to the previously measured 40% when counting
tasks. Based on the basic characteristics and the above reflections, we derived the following four
Metric Types that can be used to measure the performance of interactions:
Fig. 2. Metric Types for Measuring the Performance of Interactions.
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3.2.1 MetricType0 (Algorithmic Complexity Analysis). Algorithm analysis aims at providing a
rough estimate of the resources an algorithmmay need to solve a computational problem. Ultimately,
these estimates are then used to determine and compare the efficiencies of different algorithms [57].
Due to the Halting Problem analysing algorithmic complexity cannot be done automatically (or at
run-time). The Halting Problem describes, based on a description of an arbitrary computer program
and an input, whether the program will stop running (halt) or continue to run forever. Furthermore,
Turing [53] proved that a general algorithm to solve this problem for all possible program-input
pairs cannot exist. Thus, this means that it is impossible to implement a program that analyses
the complexity of a given algorithm, since it cannot be determined, whether the algorithm will
halt. Knowing this, we propose to use the Big-O notation to manually estimate how complex a
specific algorithm of a component is. Using the Big-O notation enables to classify the complexity of
a components algorithm. Consequently, the component with the better performing algorithm costs
less in comparison to a component with a more complex algorithm. Even thoughMetricType0 can
only be measured manually, it can be significant to know how performant a specific algorithm
is. For instance, if two components produce the same Total Costs, but one of them has a better
performing algorithm according to the Big-O estimate, they can still be compared. In that case
the results of the Big-O estimation can be used as a constant that is added to the overall result
of the Onion Layer Model. Furthermore, since the Big-O can be used to estimate the Algorithmic
Time Complexity and the Algorithmic Space Complexity, a constant representing each of them
can be added to the overall result of the Onion Layer Model. The following shows the algorithmic
complexities (Big-O) ordered from low complexity fMT0 (1) to high complexity fMT0 (n!):
fMT0 (1) < fMT0 (logn) < fMT0 (n) < fMT0 (n logn) < fMT0 (n
2) < fMT0 (2
n) < fMT0 (n!) (2)
3.2.2 MetricType1 (Difference Measurement). This metric type aims at capturing specific evalua-
tion criteria before the execution of a task and right after it to be able to calculate the difference
between those two captures. The most commonly used representative of this type is the duration
or time required to execute a given application program. The basic technique for measuring how
long it takes to perform a task is to set a timestamp before and after it, and then calculate the
difference between both timestamps. Another example for this metric type would be to measure
how a property changes before and after the execution of a certain task. For instance, the character
length of a message is different before and after using an encryption method. The same effect
is given with different communication protocols, since they add extra bytes to a given message
depending on the implementation of the protocol. All in all, determining the difference between two
measurement points is a key candidate for measuring the performance of interactions at runtime.
The following equation shows how this metric type can be used to calculate the difference between




xtend − xtstar t , where (3)
XMT1c
represents the calculated raw data measurement value ofMetricType1 (MT1) for all
functional or security-related tasks performed by component c∑T̂c
t=1
represents the sum of all difference measurement values of all functional or
security-related tasks t performed by component c
xtstar t represents the capture before task t (functional or security-related) starts
xtend represents the capture after task t (functional or security-related) ended
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3.2.3 MetricType2 (SampleMeasurement). This metric type requires to repeatedly create snapshots
during the course of executing a specific task. By doing so, many different snapshots are being
created which capture the progression of the performance during the execution time. In this
regard, measuring performance refers mainly to the usage of computing resources like the Central
Processing Unit (CPU), Random Access Memory (RAM), disk memory, and so on. In general, it
does not make any sense to measure how much CPU has been used before and after the execution
of a task. The reason for that is that the CPU utilisation at these two points in time would either be
near zero or not represent the actual usage. On the contrary, measuring the usage of computing
resources has to be constantly monitored to produce more meaningful and accurate results. In a
more metaphorical sense, evaluating the utilisation of computing resources can be compared to
measuring the heart beat of a jogging person. If there are only two heartbeat measurements, one
before running and one right after that, the results would neither have any meaning nor be accurate
enough. However, using the sample measurement type to repeatedly measure the heartbeat during
the run would produce results that reflect the performance of the jogger. Since each task can have
a different set of sample measurementsmi , we calculate the mean of all sample measurements of









represents the mean ofMetricType2 (MT2) for all sample measurement values




represents the total sum of all sample measurement values xtn of all functional
or security-related tasks performed by component c∑mi
n=1 xtn represents the sample size of all measured tasks
3.2.4 MetricType3 (Overall Result Measurement). The Type-3 metric type refers to all measure-
ments that cannot or are difficult to pin down to a specific task. In some cases, it will be hard to
determine which task is responsible for a specific measurement value at a specific point in time.
Even though measuring the power consumption in CPS is very important, it is hard to tell which
part of an executed program code consumed a specific amount of energy. To solve this problem, the
total energy consumption for all tasks performed by a component is measured and than multiplied
by the duration of performed tasks (functional or security-related). The following equation shows
how to calculate the costs ofMetricType3:
XMT3c = xtotal ∗ XMT1c , where (5)
XMT3c
represents the calculated overall result ofMetricType3 (MT3) for all functional or
security-related tasks performed by component c
xtotal
represents the total raw data measurement value of component c while performing
all functional or security-related tasks
XMT1c
represents the calculated raw data measurement value ofMetricType1 (MT1) of all
functional or security-related tasks performed by component c , as described in (3)
3.2.5 Weight Calculation. As suggested by the Onion Layer Model in (1) a set of different metrics
can be used to measure the performance of a specific task. Whereby, each metric can be an element
belonging toMetricType1,MetricType2 orMetricType3. At the same time, each metric belonging
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to one of these threeMetric Types also belongs toMetricType0, since the execution of a task always
requires an algorithm. This distinction (which metric belongs to which Metric Type) is important,
since the weightw is calculated by the number of metrics of a specific metric type. The more metrics
of the same Metric Type are used to measure a specific task the higher the weight has to be to
emphasise the measurement results. For instance, a task could be measured by four metrics, where
two metrics belong toMetricType1, one belongs toMetricType2 and the last is part ofMetricType3.
Thus, all measurement results by the metrics of MetricType1 are weighted by 0.5 (wMT1 = 0.5),
while the other results are weighted by 0.25 (wMT2 = 0.25 andwMT3 = 0.25). Following this example,
the measurement results multiplied bywMT1 = 0.5 are considered to have a bigger impact on the
overall result compared to the other two weights (wMT2 = 0.25 andwMT3 = 0.25). The reason for
that is that more metrics of MetricType1 have been used and therefore have more influence on
the total result. In this example, the measurement results multiplied bywMT1 = 0.5 are considered
to have a bigger impact on the overall result compared to the measurement results multiplied by
wMT2 = 0.25 andwMT3 = 0.25. The following equation shows how the weight is calculated based





wMTj represents the calculated weight for Metric Type j (MTj )
nMTj
is the total number of metrics that belong to Metric Type j (MTj ) and have been used
to measure task t (functional or security-related)
M̂t is the total number of metrics used to measure task t (functional or security-related)
3.3 Normalisation
As pointed out by Vafaei et al. in [54], depending on the study domain there are several definitions
of data normalisation. In this article, we use unity-based normalisation (MIN-MAX Normalisation
or Feature Scaling) to bring all measurement values with different units into the range [a,b]. This is
a generalisation to restrict the range of values between the points a (lower bound) and b (upper
bound). For simplicity reasons, we will use the range [a = 0,b = 1] in this article when normalising
anymeasurement results. Generally speaking, as summarised by Vafaei et al. [54], any normalisation
technique that brings the measurement values into a range between two points can be used. We
propose the following adapted version of MIN-MAX Normalisation, where the MIN- and MAX-
values depend on the lower and upper bounds of the Metric Type used to measure result x. The
following equation defines how to calculate the normalised value Ûx of the measured raw data value
x between the lower (MINMTj ) and upper (MAXMTj ) bounds ofMetric Type j (MTj ) between [a,b]:
Ûx = a +
(x −MINMTj ) ∗ (b − a)
MAXMTj −MINMTj
, where (7)
Ûx is the normalised value
x is the measured raw data value
MINMTj represents the lower bound of Metric Type j (MTj )
MAXMTj represents the upper bound of Metric Type j (MTj )
a,b represent the normalisation range where a ≤ Ûx ≤ b (a = min, b = max)
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3.4 Aggregation
Following the steps of the previous sections, the performance of an interaction can be measured
at runtime by different metrics belonging to one of three different Metric Types. As a result, the
functions in (3) (4) (5) can be used to calculate the raw data measurement results of the performance
of each task. In addition to thatMetricType0 can be used to estimate and classify (2) how well the
algorithm of each component performs for a given set of n tasks. Once the performance of each
task has been measured, the next step is to normalise each raw data measurement result (x ) in order
to create a normalised measurement result ( Ûx). Depending on the used Metric Type to measure x ,
the weightw is calculated next and multiplied by each normalised value ( Ûx ). Finally, each weighted
normalised value ( Ûx ∗ w) can be aggregated using the Onion Layer Model to calculate the Total
Costs (sum of Functional Costs and Security Costs) of the measured interaction. The following Figure
shows the described SCMF approach for normalising, weighing and aggregating the Total Costs:
Fig. 3. The SCMF for Normalising, Weighting and Aggregating Functional Costs and Security Costs.
The following algorithm is based on the approach from Fig. 3 and uses captured task measurement
values to normalise, weight and aggregate the resulting Functional Costs and Security Costs:
Algorithm 1: Cost Aggregation
Input: A sequence of measurement objects X = ⟨x1, x2, . . . , xn⟩
Output: The normalised and aggregated Functional and Security Costs of the given input
FunctionalCosts ← 0, SecurityCosts ← 0
foreach x ∈ X do
Ûx ← normalise(x)
w ← calculateWeiдht(x .дetMetricType())
if x .дetTask() ∈ SecurityRelatedTasks then
SecurityCosts ← SecurityCosts + ( Ûx ∗w)
else
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4 ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we describe an overall use case that has the main purpose to control the temperature
of a physical room. Next, we present the Arrowhead Framework in combination with the Pinpoint
APM tool and explain how the overall use case could be set up and measured. In this regard, we first
describe the basic idea of the Arrowhead Framework including the functionality and interoperability
of its three mandatory core systems. Furthermore, we explain how it can be used for setting up
the use case, for drawing the system boundaries of the newly deployed CPS and controlling the
behaviour within it. Finally, we show how the performance of the deployed CPS can be measured
at runtime by using the Pinpoint APM tool and the PiLogger One.
4.1 Overall Use Case
In many respects, the control system view in Fig. 4 corresponds to one of the most fundamental
definitions of CPS. Even though Helen Gill first introduced the term CPS [11], its roots can be traced
back to Norbert Wieners definition of the term cybernetics [59]. He described it as the conjunction
of computation and communication, where the control of physical processes is performed in closed-
loop feedback. The CPS in Fig. 4 follows a similar principle of two communicating components
(C1 and C2) that measure and change their physical environment (if necessary). Furthermore, this
interdependency of measuring and changing the physical world duplicates Wieners closed-loop
feedback definition of cybernetics [59]. For these two reasons, we defined an overall use case,
where two components interact with each other in a closed-loop. In this regard, the Closed-Loop
Temperature Control-use case is defined by two components which together are capable of measuring
and changing the temperature of a physical room. To do so, one component (C1) controls an air-
conditioning system, while the other component (C2) uses a temperature sensor. The following
figure shows the overall use case and illustrates the interaction between C1 and C2:
Fig. 4. Overall Use Case: Closed-Loop Temperature Control.
The interaction between these two components could be described by the following five tasks:
• Task1: before C1 decides, to turn on the air-conditioning system, it first requests the room
temperature from C2
• Task2: C2 uses its sensor to measure the current room temperature
• Task3: C2 returns the requested measurement data to C1
• Task4: once C1 receives the room temperature it verifies whether a predefined limit has
been reached. For instance, if the current temperature is higher than predefined limit the
air-conditioning system has to be turned on
• Task5: if the predefined limit has been reached, C1 activates the air-conditioning system
This overall use case describes in five basic steps, how aCPS could be set up tomeasure and change
the temperature of a physical room (if necessary). Furthermore, it illustrates the interdependency,
where a temperature measurement triggers a change of the physical world which in return again
influences the next measurement, and so on.
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4.2 Arrowhead Framework
As initially mentioned, two components that are capable of sensing and affecting the physical
world must not automatically be called a CPS. The general approach of defining which components
are part of/or belong to a specific CPS is to use an IoT-Framework. In general, these frameworks
provide some kind of procedure for enrolling new components which ensures that they enter an
existing CPS in a structured way without compromising it. More precisely, before a new component
becomes part of an existing CPS and is allowed to interact with other components, it first has to
pass a series of predefined checks. Depending on the IoT-Framework and/or the CPS requirements,
the enrolment procedure often involves security and authorisation checks, like the verification of a
pre-shared key or the validation of exchanged certificates. Some frameworks go even further by
verifying certain aspects of the component’s software and hardware features. To give an example, a
software check might include verifying which operating system (OS) is running on the component
and if the latest patches have been installed. A hardware check could involve verifying, whether a
certain chipset is being used which has known security issues. All in all, IoT-Frameworks can be
used to define the system boundaries of registered components of a CPS without compromising it.
Once the enrolment procedure has been successfully completed and the new component becomes
part of the CPS, it can start interacting with other (already registered) components. In order to
do so, it needs to know which other components are currently part of the same CPS and what
they are capable of doing. In addition to that the new component needs to know how to reach
(or communicate with) the other existing components. For instance, after the registration the two
components from Fig. 4 are part of the same CPS, are there for different reasons and provide
different functionalities. One component (C1) is capable of cooling down a physical room, while the
other component (C2) provides the functionality of measuring the room’s temperature. However,
C1 has no knowledge about the existence of C2 (or any other component within the same CPS)
and about its temperature measurement capabilities. Moreover, even if C1 had knowledge about
the existence of C2 and which functionality it provides, it still needs to know its communication
endpoint or how it can be reached. To ensure that two components can find each other before they
start to interact, the IoT-Framework has to fulfil the following additional requirements [56]:
• managing how a specific component searches for other components within the same CPS,
• enabling data exchange between coupled components, and
• regulating which components are allowed to interact with each other.
The overall goal of the Arrowhead Framework is to efficiently support the development, de-
ployment and operation of interconnected, cooperative systems using a SOA [21] philosophy. In
addition to that the Arrowhead Framework addresses the above challenges and requirements by
providing an On-Boarding Procedure [13] and three mandatory core systems [56]. Depending on
the configuration of the CPS (pre-shared key or certificate), the On-Boarding Procedure involves
different verification, authentication and authorisation steps, before allowing a new component
into an existing CPS. By splitting up the procedure in different steps involving different checks a so
called Chain of Trust is formed [13]. This ensures that only a component that completed all checks
of this chain is allowed to enter the CPS and interact with other components within it. Thus, if
only one check returns an undesired result, the entire Chain of Trust is considered as invalid and
the component is prohibited from entering the CPS.
Besides managing how new components are on-boarded, the Arrowhead Framework uses three
mandatory core systems to form a so-called local cloud. These core systems are the Service Registry
System, the Authorisation System and the Orchestrator System which together form the minimum
required system (mandatory) to deploy an Arrowhead compliant CPS. According to Delsing (2017),
the local cloud concept is based on the idea that geographically local automation tasks should be
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encapsulated and protected. Moreover, deploying the three mandatory core systems automatically
creates a local cloud that includes all nearby components (drawing a system boundary) and sup-
ports them in performing the desired automation tasks. Furthermore, this local cloud provides
security controls (e.g.: encrypted communication, authorisation, authentication, etc.) to protect the
components from outside influences [18]. In addition to that, each local cloud deployment is capable
of interconnecting with other local cloud deployments to create large-scale System of Systems
(SoS) [2]. As a result, the Arrowhead Framework is capable of managing both small groups of local
components, as well as large-scaled interconnected meshes of CPS.
To successfully manage IoT-components and enable task automation within a local cloud, the
Arrowhead Framework uses a SOA and reduces everything within a CPS to a service. Based on that
idea the CPS in Fig. 4 would reduce C1 to the Air-Conditioning Service and C2 to the Temperature
Measurement Service. More precisely, in the context of the Arrowhead Framework a service is what
is used to exchange information from providing to consuming system. For instance, as shown
in Fig. 4, C1 is consuming the Temperature Measurement Service which is provided by C2. At the
same time C1 is also providing the Air-Conditioning Service which depends on the measurement
data from Temperature Measurement Service provided by C2. Generally speaking, the idea of the
Arrowhead Framework is to deploy a local cloud to define the system boundary of nearby (local)
IoT-components. In addition to that each on-boarded component can provide one or more services to
the local cloud which can be consumed by other components. At the same time the same component
can also consume any service provided by any other component within the same local cloud
deployment. Summarizing, within a local cloud each component is defined by its provided services
which can be consumed by any other component within the same CPS.
The mandatory core systems play a key role for managing services of a CPS and controlling how
interactions are executed between two or more components. In this regard, each core system is
designed in a way that its provided services are interdependent. Furthermore, these services can be
consumed by the other core systems as well as any other component within the same CPS. As a
result, the mandatory core systems provide basic functionalities that support the automation of
tasks to successfully execute interactions between two or more components. The following sections
describe the idea, basic principles and responsibilities of the three mandatory core systems [56]:
4.2.1 Service Registry System. This system provides services for registering new services and
looking up currently active offered services (Service Discovery Service). In order to register its
own services to the local cloud, a newly introduced component publishes them in the last step of
the On-Boarding Procedure. This registration step uses the Service Registry to store all relevant
information about a service (e.g. metadata, network address, port, path, etc.) into a database. The
Service Discovery Service can later be used to search for (or lookup) existing services within the same
database. However, it is worth mentioning that instead of directly consuming the Service Discovery
Service the standard procedure for looking up a service is to send a request to the Orchestrator
System. Since the Orchestration Process involves interacting with the other two mandatory core
systems, it takes care of locating all suitable services and performing an authorisation check.
4.2.2 Authorisation System. This system provides services for creating authorisation rules that
describe which components are allowed to consume which services within a specific CPS (intra-
cloud access rule). Furthermore, it is also possible to create authorisation rules that describe which
other local clouds are allowed to consumewhich services from a specific CPS. Therefore, by providing
an Authorisation Control Service, this systems purpose is to verify which component is authorised
to consume which service within its own local cloud and other interconnected CPS. Similar to the
Service Discovery Service, the Authorisation Control Service is used during the Orchestration Process
to verify, whether a component is allowed to consume the requested service.
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4.2.3 Orchestrator System. The primary purpose of this system is to provide the communication
endpoints of other services within the local cloud including all necessary information to enable
interactions between components. Thus, the Orchestrator System represents the single point of
contact for processing any kind of requests sent by any component within the CPS. More precisely,
each request sent to the Orchestrator System will first be analysed and then forwarded to the right
systems within the local cloud (if necessary). In other words, this system handles all requests
internally and returns the results (or guiding actions) to the requesting component. For instance,
C1 would send a request to the Orchestrator System asking for a component with a Temperature
Measurement Service. This request is first forwarded to the Service Registry System which returns all
required information about C2 and its service. Before returning this information to C1, the Orches-
trator System then asks the Authorisation System, if C1 is allowed to consume the service provided
by C2. After the authorisation check is completed successfully (meaning: C1 is allowed to interact
withC2), all relevant metadata and endpoint information of the requestedTemperature Measurement
Service is sent to C1. Finally, C1 receives all necessary information to start interacting with C2 by
consuming the requested Temperature Measurement Service. Summarizing, the Orchestration Process
forms a link between the mandatory core systems and performs task automation of discovering
requested services and performing authorisation checks before returning the requested information.
4.3 Pinpoint
Pinpoint is an open source APM tool for measuring the performance of large-scale distributed
systems using an agent-based approach. Inspired by Dapper [48], Pinpoint provides a solution to
help analyse the overall structure of a system and how its components within are interconnected
by tracing transactions across distributed applications. More precisely, each component of a system
can be instrumented by using an agent that monitors the running application at runtime and
provides code-level information about any executed transaction [40]. Furthermore, according to
[39] the agent-based approach has a minimal impact on the performance of the underlying system
by an approximate 3% increase in resource usage. Summarizing, Pinpoint is a suitable tool for
measuring the performance of an Arrowhead managed CPS for the following reasons:
• the Arrowhead Framework including its mandatory core systems and Pinpoint including its
agent are both written in Java which makes them compatible
• the agent-based approach is capable of instrumenting all components of a local cloud without
changing a single line of code
• Pinpoint uses a set of different metrics to measure the performance of executed tasks
• using Pinpoint for runtime measurements has an insignificant impact on the performance
As previously mentioned, Pinpoint is modelled after Google’s Dapper and uses a combination of
Transaction Tracing and Bytecode Instrumentation techniques for measuring the performance. The
purpose of tracing transactions is to analyse relationships between two nodes in a distributed system
and identify when a message is sent from one node to the other. In this regard, the Pinpoint tracing
technique modified the Dapper approach by adding an application-level tag in the call header in
order to trace distributed transactions at a remote call. Besides that, Pinpoint adopted the bytecode
instrumentation technique to enable performance measurements at runtime without having to
change a single line of code. Instead, an agent is used to intervene Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs)
and to handle tag information automatically. Another advantage of automatic tracing is that more
precise data can be collected to more information in the bytecode. After the measurement the agent
sends the trace data to the Pinpoint Collector to store it in a database. From there, all measurements
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can be extracted, the raw data normalised, and the Total Costs calculated. The following figure
demonstrates the basic principle of transaction tracing using an automatic agent-based approach:
Fig. 5. Pinpoint Architecture for Measuring the Performance of Components (adapted from Naver, 2020).
4.4 Experimental Testbed
Based on the overall use case from Fig. 4, we setup an experimental testbed by combining the
Arrowhead Framework, the Pinpoint APM tool and the PiLogger One board. In this regard, we
deployed the mandatory core systems to create a local cloud and used the On-Boarding Procedure to
register the components C1 and C2. Furthermore, all necessary authorisation rules were created to
allow interactions between the three mandatory core systems and the two components. Moreover,
to be able to effectively compare measurement results of different components and have full control
of each test run the testbed was configured as follows:
• each of the three core systems,C1 andC2 were running on a separate Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+
• each component was connected over a Local Area Network (LAN) via Ethernet cable
• each Raspberry Pi used a minimal image based on Debian Buster (Raspbian Buster Lite) as OS
• wireless LAN, Bluetooth, the High Definition Multimedia Interface (HDMI) and the Light
Emitting Diodes (LEDs) were disabled
Since each component was running on a Raspberry Pi the comparison of the measurement results
is easier, due to the same hardware specifications. Another advantage is that interconnecting all
devices over a LAN via Ethernet cable gives more control over the network and reduces potential
disturbances from outside. Besides that, to conserve existing computing resources on each Raspberry
Pi as much as possible Raspbian Buster Lite was installed and used as OS. Finally, all unused
interfaces (HDMI, Bluetooth and LEDs) have been disabled to further reduce any loss in performance
and improve the power consumption of each component.
As shown in Fig. 6, we used one representative metric from each metric type to measure the
Functional Costs and the Security Costs of a deployed CPS. In this regard, the execution time of
tasks (MetricType1) and the CPU-usage (MetricType2) were measured using a Pinpoint Agent for
each component. Each agent was used to instrument the bytecode of the control logic of each
component and measure the performance of each task. After that the measurement raw data is
sent to the Pinpoint Collector which stores it into a database (Performance Raw Data).
Besides measuring the execution time (MetricType1) and CPU-usage (MetricType2), the power
consumption (MetricType3) was measured by adding a PiLogger One [58] to each component. By
doing so the PiLogger One adds an autonomous working four-channel measuring system connected
via Inter-Integrated Circuit (I 2C) bus to the Raspberry Pi. In addition to that the PiLogger One comes
with its own timebase which allows precise timed intervals between measurements independent of
the actual activity running on the Raspberry Pi. The concept of an autonomous peripheral unit
enables measuring the power consumption (voltage and current) of components using a Raspberry
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Pi. Similar to the Pinpoint Collector, the measured power consumption data can be retrieved and
stored in a separate database (Power Consumption Raw Data).
In the end, the measured performance and power consumption raw data can be extracted from
both databases to calculate (normalise and aggregate) the Functional Costs and the Security Costs
using the Onion Layer Model. Summarizing, an experimental testbed consisting of the Arrowhead
Framework, the Pinpoint APM tool and the PiLogger One extension card enables configuring CPS,
running interactions and measuring their performance. The following figure shows the testbed
setup including all components (mandatory core systems,C1 andC2), Pinpoint Agents and PiLogger
One boards:
Fig. 6. Setup of the Experimental Testbed using the Arrowhead Framework, Pinpoint APM and PiLogger One.
5 EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
In this section, we show how the overall use case from Fig. 4 can bemeasured using the Experimental
Testbed setup as shown in Fig. 6. In this regard, we present two possible solutions (Use Case 1, Use
Case 2) for implementing the Closed-Loop Temperature Control interaction of the overall use case
using the Arrowhead Framework. Next, we define four different workloads (WL1.1,WL1.2,WL2.1,
WL2.2) and explain how they have been used to measure, normalise and aggregate the Functional
Costs and the Security Costs during the experimental study.
5.1 Experimental Settings
As shown in Fig. 4, the overall goal of the Closed-Loop Temperature Control interaction is to measure,
analyse and change the temperature of a physical room (if necessary). To achieve this goal, the
interaction involves one component that controls an air-conditioning system (C1) and another one
that uses a temperature sensor (C2). To successfully implement this interaction, we first deployed
an Arrowhead local cloud with its three mandatory core systems. Next, we used the On-Boarding
Procedure to register the Air-Conditioning Service ofC1 and the Temperature Measurement Service of
C2 to the database of the Service Registry System. Additionally, we created a rule that defines that
C1 and C2 are authorised to interact with each other. At this point, C1 and C2 belong to the same
CPS but have no information about each other.
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According to the Arrowhead Framework a component within a local cloud can either be a Producer
or a Consumer. As shown in Fig. 4, C2 is a Producer that offers a Temperature Measurement Service
that can be consumed by other components. On the contrary, C1 is a Consumer that consumes
the services provided by C2 to decide whether the air-conditioning system needs to be activated
or not. As described by the Arrowhead Framework, the recommended practice for designing
interactions is that the Consumer has to lookup the Producer by sending a request to the Orchestrator
System. However, it would not be wrong to start the interaction the other way around either, where
the Producer (C2) sends a request to the Orchestrator System looking for the Consumer. Thus, to
successfully execute the Closed-Loop Temperature Control interaction, we implemented both use
cases and measured their performance to identify which use case is more efficient.
5.1.1 Use Case 1 - Consumer to Producer. As already mentioned, after C1 and C2 have been suc-
cessfully on-boarded they cannot start to interact with each other right away. Instead, they can
look for the other component by sending a request to the Orchestrator System which takes care of
the lookup and authorisation check within the local cloud. In this regard, the Orchestrator System
first forwards the original request to the Service Registry System which searches its database to
lookup the requested component (C2) with the temperature sensor. If there is such a component,
the Orchestrator System asks the Authorisation System, if there is a rule that allows the requesting
component (C1) and the requested component (C2) to interact with each other. Upon a successful
authorisation check, the Orchestrator System returns the endpoint data of C2 to C1 which now
triggers the interaction between those two components. According to the best-practice guidelines
provided by the Arrowhead Framework, C1 has to initiate the Closed-Loop Temperature Control
interaction, by requesting the endpoint of C2 from the Orchestrator System. Fig. 7 shows the steps
of the Closed-Loop Temperature Control interaction following the Consumer to Producer approach:
Fig. 7. Closed-Loop Temperature Control Interaction initiated by C1 (Use Case 1 - Consumer to Producer).
As shown in Fig. 7, each component performs different tasks to reach the overall goal of measuring
and controlling the temperature of a physical room. In this regard, the tasks performed by C1,
C2 and the Service Registry System are mainly functional tasks, while the Authorisation System is
mainly responsible for security-related tasks. The Orchestrator System is a hybrid system, since it
performs functional tasks when interacting with the Service Registry System, but also performs
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security-related tasks when communicating with the Authorisation System. To measure the Security
Costs of Use Case 1, all tasks performed by the Authorisation System and its interaction with the
Orchestrator System have to be included in the SCMF. The following listing describes the purpose
and functionality of each task from Fig. 7 (red = security-related tasks):
• T1: C1 requests a component with a temperature sensor from the Orchestrator System
• T2: the Orchestrator System forwards the request to the Service Registry System
• T3: the Service Registry System searches its database and returns C2
• T4: the Orchestrator System asks the Authorisation System if C1 is allowed to consume C2
• T5: the Authorisation System searches all authorisation rules and returns C1 is authorised
• T6: the Orchestrator System returns the endpoint of C2 to C1
• T7: C1 requests the temperature of the room from C2
• T8: C2 uses its sensor to measure the temperature
• T9: C2 returns the measured value to C1
• T10: C1 checks if the measured value is greater than a predefined limit (limit = 25°C)
• T11: if the measurement is greater than the limit C1 activates the air-conditioning system
5.1.2 Use Case 2 - Producer to Consumer. Even though the use case in Fig. 7 is the recommended
way it has one crucial disadvantage. The entire interaction is executed from T1 to T10 even if the
measured room temperature is below the predefined limit of 25°C. This means that when the
measured room temperature is below 25°C, these ten tasks have been executed without causing
any effect. To overcome this issue, the second use case is designed in a way that C2 (instead of
C1) initiates the entire interaction. Fig. 8 shows the steps of the Closed-Loop Temperature Control
interaction following the redesigned Producer to Consumer approach:
Fig. 8. Closed-Loop Temperature Control Interaction initiated by C2 (Use Case 2 - Producer to Consumer).
As shown in Fig. 8, the first two tasks of C2 are to measure the room temperature and check,
whether the predefined limit has been reached, or not. These two steps are executed in a continuous
loop, until finally the measured temperature is higher than 25°C. Only then all the other tasks from
the Closed-Loop Temperature Control interaction are executed. The advantage of this approach is
that the additional tasks from T3 to T10 are only executed, when they are really required. Besides
changing the initiating component (from C1 to C2) all other tasks are executed the same way as
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before. The only difference is that the Service Registry System returns the endpoint ofC1 (instead of
C2) and the Authorisation System checks the authorisation of C2 (instead of C1). This also includes
the components responsible for executing the security-related tasks (Authorisation System and
its interaction with the Orchestrator System). The following listing describes the purpose and
functionality of each task from Fig. 8 (red = security-related tasks):
• T1: C2 uses its sensor to measure the temperature
• T2: C2 checks if the measured value is greater than a predefined limit (limit = 25°C)
• T3: if the measurement is greater than the limit, C2 requests a component with an air-
conditioning system from the Orchestrator System
• T4: the Orchestrator System forwards the request to the Service Registry System
• T5: the Service Registry System searches its database and returns C1
• T6: the Orchestrator System asks the Authorisation System if C2 is allowed to consume C1
• T7: the Authorisation System searches all authorisation rules and returns C2 is authorised
• T8: the Orchestrator System returns the endpoint of C1 to C2
• T9: C2 sends a requests to C1 to start cooling down the room
• T10: C1 activates the air-conditioning system
5.1.3 Workload Controller. As described above, both use cases use different approaches to achieve
the overall goal of the Closed-Loop Temperature Control interaction. The first use case follows the
recommended Consumer to Producer approach, while the second use case initiates the interaction
the other way around (Producer to Consumer). To measure the Functional Costs and the Security
Costs of both use cases, we designed a controlled experimental study where a Workload Controller
started each use case by using the following four workloads:
Table 2. Workloads used by the Workload Controller for the Experimental Study
WL Use Case Runs Temperature Protocol
















As shown in Table 2, each workload was executed on either the first, or the second use case in a
total of 50 runs per workload. In addition to the first 25 runs generated a value below 25°C every
time the temperature sensor of C2 was used to measure the room temperature. The remaining 25
runs of the same workload generated a measurement value above 25°C. The reason for that was to
split up the total runs into two equal groups and evaluate the Functional Costs and Security Costs of
both temperature measurement outcomes for both use cases. Besides that, each workload defined
that the components either used a secure (HTTPS) or insecure (HTTP) communication protocol
when exchanging messages with each other. Similar to [41], we used the secure/insecure protocol
option in each workload to measure the costs of the "S" in HTTPS. This allows to quantify the
Security Costs of the secure communication protocol by comparing the measurement results with
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its insecure counterpart. In addition to the four workloads in Table 2, we used the following metrics
to measure the performance of each interaction:
Table 3. Performance Metrics for Measuring Functional Costs and Security Costs for each Workload
Metric Type Metric Unit
MT0 Algorithmic Time Complexity (Big-O) -
MT1 Duration of executing a specific task Milliseconds (ms)
MT2 CPU-usage Percent (%)
MT3 Power consumption Milliwattseconds (mWs)
To show how to successfully measure the Total Costs of both use cases by using the SCMF, we
defined one representative metric for each of the four Metric Types. As shown in Table 3, these
metrics were used to measure the performance while executing each of the defined workloads from
Table 2. After that each raw data measurement value was normalised, weighted and aggregated
following the SCMF approach from Fig. 3. As a result, the controlled experimental setup enables to
use predefined workloads in combination with four different metrics to evaluate which use case
executes the Closed-Loop Temperature Control interaction more efficiently.
5.2 Total Cost Evaluation and Security Cost Extraction of Use Case 1 and Use Case 2
Following the presented SCMF approach as shown in Fig. 3, the first step is to measure and calculate
the raw data measurement results. In this regard we used the first metric from Table 3 to estimate the
algorithmic time complexity of each component using the Big-O notation. As previously described,
due to the Halting Problem this step has to be done manually by analysing the program code of the
Arrowhead Framework for each of the five components. The following table shows the results of
the algorithmic time complexity estimation for each workload:
Table 4. Algorithmic Time Complexity Estimation per Workload
Component
Workloads
WL1.1 WL1.2 WL2.1 WL2.2
C1 n n 1 1
C2 1 1 n n
Orchestrator System n n n n
Service Registry System n n n n
Authorisation System n n n n
As shown in Table 4, the algorithmic time complexity of the three mandatory core systems (Or-
chestrator System, Service Registry System, Authorisation System) is fMT0 (n) = n for every workload.
This is an expected result, since the three core systems executed the same tasks in the same order
using the same algorithms in both use cases. The difference in algorithmic time complexity can
be shown when looking at C1 and C2. Depending on the use case and which component is the
initiator of the entire Closed-Loop Temperature Control interaction, the algorithm of the initiating
component is shown to be more complex. For instance, in Use Case 1 whereC1 starts the interaction
by sending a request to the Orchestrator System, its algorithmic time complexity is fMT0 (n) = n. For
the same use case C2 has an algorithmic time complexity of fMT0 (n) = 1. This result is reversed in
Use Case 2, since the initiating component changes form C1 to C2.
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After classifying the algorithmic time complexity, the next step is to measure and calculate the raw
data results at runtime for theMetric Types MT1,MT2,MT3. As shown in Fig. 6, the Pinpoint Agents
are used to measure the duration (MT1) and CPU-usage (MT2) for each task of each component. In
addition to that the PiLogger One board is attached to each Raspberry Pi to measure the total power
consumption (MT3) of all components. This means that the equations (3) and (4) are integrated in
the Pinpoint Agent to calculate the raw data measurement results for the duration and CPU-usage
at runtime. To show in an example how these two equations are used in practice, let’s assume that
component c performed two security-related tasks s1 and s2. The following example shows, how to
measure the duration of these two tasks:
X1MT1 = 10ms − 00ms = 10ms ,
as described in (3)
X2MT1 = 30ms − 10ms = 20ms ,
As described in (3), calculating the duration of a task requires to capture a timestamp right before
and one right after the execution of the task. The difference of those two capture points (start and
end) is the calculated raw measurement data forMT1. On the contrary, measuring the CPU-usage
(MT2) requires many sample snapshots, while a certain task has been executed. The number of
these snapshots can differ depending on how long the execution time of the task was, or in other
words how much time there was to create snapshots. Thus, let’s again assume that the number of
snapshots created during the execution of s1 wasm1 = 3, while the number of snapshots for s2 was




= (1.825%) as described in (4)
As described in (4), to calculate the CPU-usage of a component the overall mean of the of used
CPU of each task has to be included. This means that the sum of all sample measurements of all
tasks is divided by the sum of the number of created snapshots. By doing so the different sample
sizes (m1 = 3 andm2 = 5) of all sample measurement snapshots are combined when calculating
the overall mean of all tasks of a component. The resulting overall mean CPU-usage represents a
number that expresses how much CPU was utilised by a component on average while performing
all its security-related tasks.
Similar to the Pinpoint Agents that use the equations (3) and (4) to calculate the duration and
CPU-usage, the PiLogger One board uses equation (5) to calculate the power consumption. In this
regard, the integrated software that controls the measurement board attached to each Raspberry Pi
calculates the total power consumption while a component is performing all tasks. The following
example shows how to measure the total power consumption of component c:
X1MT3c = 0.5mW ∗ 0.01s = 0.005mWs ,
as described in (5)
X2MT3c = 0.5mW ∗ 0.02s = 0.010mWs ,
As shown in the example above, the PiLogger One board measured 0.5mW while component
c performed the two security-related tasks s1 and s2. To calculate the total power consumption
(e.g.mWs) for component c the previously measured execution times (X1MT1 = 10ms = 0.01s and
X2MT1 = 20ms = 0.02s) have to be multiplied by the 0.5mW . The same approach, as shown in
these three examples, was used to measure and calculate the raw data measurement results for
all components while executing the defined workloads. After that the next step of the SCMF is
to normalise each raw data value x to calculate the normalised value Ûx by using equation (7). As
mentioned before, the unity-basedMIN-MAX Normalisation brings all raw data values with different
units into the range [a,b]. In this article, we defined the lower bound a = 0 and the upper bound
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b = 1, to normalise all raw data value between the range of [0, 1]. In addition to, and as described
in (7), we define the following lower and upper bounds for each metric type:
Table 5. Lower Bound (MIN) and Upper Bound (MAX) for each Metric Type




Generally speaking, the lower and upper bounds have to be assigned a value where the measured
raw data value x is within the range ofMINMTj < x < MAXMTj . As shown in Table 5, we defined
the lower and upper bounds to represent extreme values that cannot be reached by anymeasurement
result. For instance, the Arrowhead Framework has a constant that sets the connection timeout to
1000ms . In other words, when communicating with a component they must reply within 1000ms ,
otherwise the connection is dropped. For that reason we choose to set the upper bound forMT1
to 1000. Similar to that we defined the upper bound ofMT2 to 100, since it is virtually impossible
to use more than 100% of a CPU. A Raspberry Pi that is running using 100% CPU and running 24
hours a day for an entire year, has a power consumption of approximately 45 Kilowatthours (kWh).
We used this number to calculate that the same Raspberry Pi would have a power consumption
of 1.4mWs . To set a high and unreachable upper boundary for MT3, we set it to 10mWs for the
normalising all measurement results. The following example shows, how the previously calculated
raw data measurement values of X1MT1 , X2MT1 , X1MT2c , X1MT3c and X2MT3c can be normalised using
the MIN-MAX Normalisation as described in (7):








ÛX3 = 0 +
(1.825%−0ms)∗(1−0)
1000−0
= 0.01825, as described in (7)








After normalising each measurement, each normalised value has to be weighted using its cal-
culated weight depending on the metric type. As described in (6) the weight is calculated by the
number of metrics used divided by the total number of metrics. Since one representative metric is








Finally, the following example shows how the Onion Layer Model (1) can be used to calculate the
Security Costs of all security-related task, performed by component c during interaction i:
SecurityCostsCPS1 = (0.01 + 0.02 + 0.01825 + 0.0005 + 0.0010) ∗
1
3
= 0.01658Û3, as described in (1)
The same approach as shown in Fig. 3 and as explained in the examples above, was used to
measure, normalise and aggregate the Functional Costs and the Security Costs of Use Case 1 and
Use Case 2. In this regard, each workload was executed separately and the SCMF was used to
measure, normalise and aggregate the Total Costs and Security Costs. The Total Costs, on the one
hand, refer to the measurements of all tasks, no matter if they were functional or security-related.
The Security Costs, on the other hand, represent only the measurements of the security-related tasks.
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The separation of the costs in those two groups enables to show the proportion of the Security
Costs in comparison to the Total Costs for each workload. The following table summarises the
measurement results of the experimental study for each workload regarding the Total Costs:
Table 6. Total Costs per Workload
WL Measurement Min Max Median Mean Std.Dev. Std.Err.
∑
WL1.1
< 25°C 0.00083 0.36000 0.01800 0.04377 0.05060 0.00221
53.92297
> 25°C 0.00100 0.28755 0.02200 0.05894 0.07366 0.00321
WL1.2
< 25°C 0.00070 0.34000 0.02100 0.04876 0.05830 0.00254
53.51435
> 25°C 0.00089 0.39874 0.02000 0.05317 0.06804 0.00297
WL2.1
< 25°C 0 0.08281 0 0.00472 0.01431 0.00062
36.15943
> 25°C 0.00100 0.44075 0.02642 0.06415 0.08218 0.00359
WL2.2
< 25°C 0 0.10100 0 0.00480 0.01471 0.00064
31.57160
> 25°C 0.00100 0.37200 0.02066 0.05534 0.07307 0.00319
The following table summarises the measurement results of the experimental study for each
workload regarding the Security Costs:
Table 7. Security Costs per Workload
WL Measurement Min Max Median Mean Std.Dev. Std.Err.
∑
WL1.1
< 25°C 0.00267 0.13728 0.01500 0.04714 0.05065 0.00414
17.61541
> 25°C 0.00267 0.27930 0.02231 0.07030 0.08565 0.00699
WL1.2
< 25°C 0.00244 0.16359 0.01400 0.04861 0.05337 0.00436
16.08108
> 25°C 0.00178 0.23166 0.01500 0.05859 0.07342 0.00599
WL2.1
< 25°C 0 0 0 0 0 0
10.97640
> 25°C 0.00267 0.29200 0.02486 0.07318 0.08504 0.00694
WL2.2
< 25°C 0 0 0 0 0 0
10.02343
> 25°C 0.00200 0.31474 0.02239 0.06682 0.08074 0.00659
6 DISCUSSION AND FUTUREWORK
The results of the experimental study show that changing the component that initiates the Closed-
Loop Temperature Control interaction can have significant impact on the overall performance. To
obtain these measurement results, we followed the steps of the SCMF to evaluate the performance
of each workload from Table 2 by using the metrics from Table 3. As described in Section 5.2 the
steps of the SCMF can be summarised as follows:
• Step 1: perform Algorithmic Complexity Analysis (MT0), as described in (2)
• Step 2: perform all Difference Measurements (MT1), Sample Measurements (MT2) and Overall
Result Measurements (MT3) for each workload, as described in (3), (4) and (5)
• Step 3: normalise each raw data measurement result from Step 2, as described in (6)
• Step 4: calculate the weights for each metric type, as described in (7)
• Step 5: aggregate each normalised result from Step 3 multiplied by the corresponding calcu-
lated weight from Step 4, as described in (1)
• Step 6: add the result from Step 1 as a constant to the overall result from Step 5
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The results in Table 6 and Table 7 show that Use Case 2 performs around 33% better compared
to Use Case 1. The main reason for this is that in Use Case 1 all components participate during
the interaction, no matter if the measured room temperature is above the predefined limit or not.
This means that each component executes its tasks, even if the air-conditioning system does not
have to be activated in the end. In Use Case 2, however, the entire Closed-Loop Temperature Control
interaction including all its components is only executed when the measured temperature limit is
above the limit. The other times, when the temperature is below the limit, only the component with
the temperature sensor (C2) is involved while the others are idle. This idle state of components is
mainly shown forWL2.1 andWL2.2, since these workloads are executed mainly on the Use Case 2.
The results also show that both use cases spend around 30% of their time computing resources
and power for performing security-related tasks. Having 30% of tasks security-related is the same
in both use cases and in each workload. The reason for this is that the security-related tasks are
always executed in the same way, no matter if the temperature limit has been reached or not. So
once an entire interaction cycle where all components are involved is executed the number of
security-related tasks stays the same. This means that the performance improvement of 33% is
mainly influenced by the temperature measurement and whether the predefined limit has been
reached or not. Nevertheless, this simple experiment shows that the Total Costs of an interaction
can be improved significantly by changing a small parameter (e.g. the initiating component fromC1
toC2). As a result, the Security Costs also improved as a consequence of the reduction in Total Costs.
The results also confirm that the HTTPS protocol produces additional costs in comparison to its
insecure counterpart (HTTP). Even though this additional overhead is small, it has to be considered
when aggregating the overall Security Costs of a CPS. In this case the difference betweenWL1.1
andWL1.2 has to be added to the overall Security Costs of Use Case 1. The same has to be done for
WL2.1 andWL2.2 in Use Case 2. Additionally, the algorithmic time complexity estimation constant
has to be added to the total sum to finally calculate the overall Security Costs for both use cases:
Use Case 1: SecurityCostsCPS1 = (53.92297 − 53.51435) + 17.61541 = 18.02403 + fMT0 (n)
Use Case 2: SecurityCostsCPS1 = (36.15943 − 31.57160) + 10.97640 = 15.56423 + fMT0 (n)
Since CPS are large-scaled, distributed systems that can become very complex it is getting
increasingly difficult to keep track, monitor and understand the behaviour of its components. De-
veloping these systems poses a huge challenge since they have to be designed in a way that ensures
security throughout all distributed computing nodes without impacting the overall performance.
The results of the Experimental Study showed that the overall performance of a CPS could be
significantly improved by designing the interaction to execute all security-related tasks only when
necessary. Or in other words, by deciding to implement an interaction in a certain way can have
a positive/negative impact on the performance of a CPS. The presented SCMF can be used to
measure the performance of a CPS by using different metrics, normalise these results to create
a generic Cost Unit and aggregate them using the Onion Layer Model. In further work we would
like to extend the SCMF as shown in Fig. 3 by researching performance measurement metrics
and their efficacy in more detail. In this regard, our plan is to identify all relevant metrics for
measuring the performance of CPS, catagorise them by metric types and evaluate their efficacy
for measuring Security Costs. Additionally, we are planning to also search the literature for all
techniques for scaling measurement results with different units to a generic Cost Unit and discuss
their trade-offs. These two additions would add more depth to the SCMF by providing a Metric
Catalogue for measuring Security Costs and relevant scaling techniques including their trade-offs.
Another interesting application field for the SCMF is to use it for optimising the performance of
interactions at Design Time. In this regard all measured and scaled results could be used to find an
optimal solution for an interaction which achieves the same goal while producing the least Security
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Costs. More precisely, as shown in the Experimental Study we defined different workloads for the
same interaction that were measured, analysed and compared. For this we used different types
(secure and insecure) of the same communication protocol to identify how much the "S" costs in
HTTPS. The same approach could be used to define workloads where one interactions uses many
different secure protocols to identify which of them produces the least Security Costs. We also plan
to investigate methodologies for trying different configurations of an interaction (e.g. different
secure protocols) and measure their resulting Security Costs.
7 CONCLUSION
In this article we propose a framework for measuring, normalising and aggregating Functional
Costs and Security Costs of CPS. The SCMF provides an Onion Layer Model for formally describing
a CPS based on its interactions, their participating components and performed functional and
security-related tasks. In addition to that we present four Metric Types (MT0,MT1,MT2,MT3) and
show how they can be used to measure these tasks and calculate the resulting costs. Furthermore,
we show how the measured and calculated raw data values can be normalised and weighted. This
enables the transformation of measurement values with different units to a common Cost Unit and
to aggregate the Functional Costs and Security Costs using the presented Cost Aggregation algorithm.
In addition to the model, we also describe the minimum requirements to set up and measure the
performance of a CPS. The presented architectural design describes the need for an IoT-Framework
(such as Arrowhead Framework) to draw the system boundaries of a CPS and control the behaviour
within it. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the Functional Costs and the Security Costs of a CPS
can be measured by using an agent-based bytecode instrumentation tool (e.g. Pinpoint APM) in
combination with the PiLogger One board. Based on the model and architectural design we present
our experimental testbed setup of a CPS with a Closed-Loop Temperature Control interaction. Finally,
we describe two ways of implementing this interaction (Use Case 1, Use Case 2), measure their
overall performance and show which implementation is more efficient. Furthermore, by extracting
the Security Costs from the Total Costs we show the portion of the overhead imposed by executing
security-related tasks. This can also be helpful at Design Time to evaluate which implementation of
an interaction preserves its cyber-security countermeasures while optimally using its resources.
Our experimental study reveals that the Use Case 2 produced around 33% less Security Costs
compared to Use Case 1, while executing the Closed-Loop Temperature Control interaction. Moreover,
the results confirmed that the "S" in HTTPS produces additional costs which have to be included
in the overall result of the aggregated Security Costs for both use cases. Summarising, in this
article we presented the SCMF and described each step of measuring, normalising and aggregating
the Functional Costs and the Security Costs of CPS. In addition to that we also described the
architectural elements needed to be able to apply the SCMF in a real use case. Finally, we showed
in an experimental study that the SCMF can be used to model the overall performance (Total Costs)
of two interactions to identify which of them is more efficient.
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